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How many choices for broadband internet does the typical American 
consumer have? A recent report issued by the Federal Communications 
Commission (“FCC”) surveying advanced telecommunications capability1 
across the country found that only 38 percent of Americans have more than 
one choice of providers for fixed advanced telecommunications capability.2 
“The competitive options for advanced telecommunications capability are 
even more limited for Americans living in rural areas, with only 13 percent 
having more than one choice of providers of these services.”3 The significant 
market power of internet service providers (“ISPs”) in the internet 
 
 1. The term “advanced telecommunications capability” is defined by Congress as “high-
speed, switched, broadband telecommunications capability that enables users to originate and 
receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, and video telecommunications using any technology.” 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, §706, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). 
 2. See In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in A Reasonable & Timely Fashion, & Possible 
Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, As Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, 31 FCC Rcd. 699, 702 ¶ 6 (2016) 
[hereinafter 2016 Broadband Progress Report]. 
 3. Id. 
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marketplace gives ISPs the ability and incentive to adopt anticompetitive 
practices favoring the content of their affiliate content providers.4 
In 2015, the FCC adopted a regulatory framework “protecting and 
promoting the open internet,” the 2015 Open Internet Order (“2015 Order”),5 
commonly known as “net neutrality” rules.6 These rules prevented ISPs from 
exercising their gatekeeper power in ways that excluded or prioritized edge 
provider content, harming competition. The FCC provided detailed studies 
demonstrating ISPs significant gatekeeper power and the need to curb this 
power to support its implementation of bright-line conduct rules. These rules 
prohibited broadband providers from engaging in three types of conduct that 
the FCC found harmful to an open internet: blocking, throttling, and paid 
prioritization.7 The FCC addressed the inability of antitrust alone to curb 
exclusionary conduct by ISPs,8 finding that “case-by-case enforcement [was] 
cumbersome for individual consumers or edge providers, and that there is no 
practical means to measure the extent to which edge innovation and 
investment would be chilled”9 without conduct rules. Instead, antitrust 
enforcers would work in concert with the new bright-line conduct rules to 
ensure competition in the marketplace.10 To allay concerns voiced by ISPs 
during the comment period, the final 2015 Order adopted a “light touch” 
approach, making over 700 codified rules applicable to Title II common 
carriers inapplicable to ISPs.11 This was a “carefully tailored application of 
only those Title II provisions found to directly further the public interest in 
an open internet.”12 
In 2017, Commissioner Ajit Pai, a vehement dissenter of the 2015 Order, 
was designated Chairman of the FCC. Soon after, the FCC issued a Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking suggesting the repeal of the clear, bright-line 
conduct rules of the 2015 Order and replacing them with the case-by-case 
enforcement the FCC had declared impractical only three years earlier.13 
The Restoring Internet Freedom Order of 2018 (“2018 Order”) in effect 
today relies solely on antitrust enforcement and mandatory disclosures by 
 
 4. See infra Part I.D.1. 
 5. In the Matter of Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015) 
[hereinafter 2015 Order]. 
 6. See infra Part I.A. 
 7. 2015 Order, supra note 5, at 5607–8 ¶¶ 14–18. 
 8. See infra Part I.D.1. 
 9. 2015 Order, supra note 5, at 5608 ¶ 19. 
 10. Id. at 5693 ¶ 203. 
 11. Id. at 5612 ¶ 37. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Restoring Internet Freedom, 82 Fed. Reg. 25568 (proposed June 2, 2017). 
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ISPs of their exclusionary conduct, to prevent the harms to competition 
posed by ISPs’ gatekeeper power. It does so without presenting hard 
evidence to rebut the FCC’s previous findings that antitrust enforcement 
alone is insufficient, and that conduct rules are necessary to protect the open 
internet market.14  
This note posits that the 2015 Order’s “light touch framework” correctly 
found that bright-line conduct rules are necessary to regulate ISPs’ 
gatekeeper power and prevent them from engaging in exclusionary conduct. 
It further argues that the FCC correctly determined that case-by-case antitrust 
enforcement alone is not a practical solution for preventing ISPs from 
abusing their power. This note proceeds in the following manner: Part I 
explains the history of the concept of net neutrality and the events leading up 
to the 2015 Order. It then details the regulations of the 2015 Order and the 
FCC’s support for these regulations. Part II examines the 2018 Order’s 
changes as well as the justifications, or lack thereof, provided to support 
these changes. Part III explores the principal argument that antitrust 
enforcement is unable to substitute the clear, bright-line conduct rules of the 
2015 Order. It does so by first examining the conduct at issue, vertical 
agreements and “single firm” exclusionary conduct, and addressing the 
historical lack of legal development and enforcement in this area. It then 
gives a brief overview of the ideological underpinnings of the Chicago 
School literature, often credited with influencing the inattention to vertical 
conduct in antitrust. The note proceeds by examining the difficulties inherent 
in both private and public enforcement, and why such actions will not 
provide remedies for the harms caused by anticompetitive behavior in the 
internet marketplace. The note then uses vertical mergers, one sub-type of 
the vertical agreements at issue, to demonstrate the permissive view antitrust 
discourse generally takes toward vertical arrangements. It examines two 
vertical merger cases from the past decade. The AT&T-Time Warner merger 
case exemplifies this permissive view of vertical mergers between an ISP 
and a content provider even after regulatory protections of the 2015 Order 
were repealed. Then, the Comcast-NBCU merger demonstrates the 
ineffectiveness of the conduct remedies put in place when a court finds a 
vertical merger problematic. Finally, this note concludes that antitrust is an 





 14. See generally 2015 Order, supra note 5. 
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I.  Net Neutrality 
 
Without strong competition, [broadband] providers can (and do) 
raise prices, delay investments, and provide sub-par quality of 
service. When faced with limited or nonexistent alternatives, 
consumers lack negotiating power and are forced to rely on 
whatever options are available. In these situations, the role of 
good public policy can and should be to foster competition and 
increase consumer choice.”15 
— Former President Barack Obama January 14, 2015 
 
The FCC first attempted to address ISPs’ anticompetitive conduct in 
2010.16 The 2010 Open Internet Order (“2010 Order”) prevented ISPs from 
intentionally blocking or throttling any content by imposing “disclosure, 
anti-blocking, and anti-discrimination requirements on broadband 
providers.”17 
 
A.  What is Net Neutrality? 
 
The term “network neutrality” gained popularity in a 2003 law review 
article by Tim Wu,18 examining whether an internet service provider should 
be required to treat all data and content it delivers equally.19 Wu’s article 
suggests that a regulatory regime treating all content equally will serve to 
“prevent a distortion in the market for internet applications”20 without 
“imping[ing] the ability of broadband carriers to earn a return from their 
infrastructure investments.”21 Today, net neutrality is commonly defined as 
 
 15. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Community Broadband Solutions: The Benefits of 
Competition and Choice for Community Development and Highspeed Internet Access, p. 3–4 (Jan. 
14, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/community-based_broad 
band_report_by_executive_office_of_the_president.pdf. 
 16. See generally In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Indus. Practices, 
25 FCC Rcd. 17905 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 Open Internet Order]. 
 17. KEVIN E. MCCARTHY, OLR BACKGROUNDER: APPELLATE COURT DECISION ON NET 
NEUTRALITY 3 (2014), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2014/rpt /pdf/2014-R-0033.pdf. See 2010 Open 
Internet Order, supra note 16, at 17906, 17936–50. 
 18. See TIM WU, A PROPOSAL FOR NETWORK NEUTRALITY 1 (June 2002), http://www. 
timwu.org/OriginalNNProposal.pdf. 
 19. Id. at 2–3. 
 20. Id. at 6. 
 21. Id. at 9. 
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prohibiting prioritization of internet traffic, with or without compensation.22 
“Edge providers,” also known as content providers, provide content for the 
internet, 23 including applications, video content, websites, and services an 
end user of the internet seeks to access.24 The major commercial content 
providers include, for example, Amazon, Facebook, Google, Netflix, and 
Skype. ISPs are broadband providers that handle traffic flow from edge 
providers ultimately delivering the content to the end-user, the consumer.25 
Examples of these include AT&T, Comcast, and Verizon.  
The net neutrality debate has two prevailing sides. Opponents of net 
neutrality regulations take the position that allowing for different data 
treatment and charging structures for certain content providers allows them 
to invest in faster service and better technological developments.26 On the 
other hand, proponents of net neutrality rules argue that such regulation of 
ISPs is necessary insurance for the maintenance of consumer choice, and 
prevents ISPs from becoming the gatekeepers of end-user content.27  
 
B.  The Development and Importance of Net Neutrality Rules 
 
1. Title I and Title II Classifications   
 
The legal framework for the 2015 Order has its roots in the 
Communications Act of 1934, which combined and organized federal 
regulation of telephone, telegraph, and radio communications, as well as 
created the FCC to oversee and regulate these industries.28 The Act 
differentiates between “general information services” and “common 
carriers,” the term “common carrier” referring to “any person engaged as a 
common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or 
radio.”29 Under Title II, the Commission has the authority to ensure that 
common carriers do not engage in unjust and unreasonable practices or 
preferences.30 In 1968, the FCC applied Title II regulation to telephone 
 
 22. Shane Greenstein, et al., Net Neutrality: A Fast Lane to Understanding the Tradeoffs, 30 
J. ECON. PERSP. 127, 128 (2016). 
 23. 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 16, at 17907 note 2 (defining an edge provider as 
providers of content, applications, services, and devices). 
 24. 2015 Order, supra note 5, at 5607. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Greenstein, et al., supra note 22, at 128. 
 27. Id. 
 28. 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. 
 29. 47 U.S.C. § 153. 
 30. 2015 Order, supra note 5, at 5894. 
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companies, requiring that they allow customers to use equipment of their 
choice on the network.31 As a common carrier service, telephone companies 
were required to provide services to businesses of all kinds, even ones they 
saw as potential competitors.32 This authority was used as a legal basis for 
the bright-line conduct rules in the 2015 Order. 
 
2. History   
 
The issue of how to classify broadband internet under the 
Communications Act first arose in the courts in 2000.33 The Ninth Circuit 
held that “cable modem service is a telecommunications service to the extent 
that the cable operator provides its subscribers internet transmission over its 
cable broadband facility, and an information service to the extent the 
operator acts as a conventional ISP.”34 This meant that cable broadband 
internet providers would be subject to regulations of a Title II-classified 
service, meaning that they could not throttle or prioritize content. Then, in 
2002, the FCC classified broadband internet providers as Title I service 
providers, subjecting them to minimal regulation.35  
In 2010, Comcast throttled down the speed of Netflix video, and 
demanded that Netflix either enter into a paid peering arrangement with 
Comcast or upgrade its transit network, prompting the FCC to issue the 2010 
Order.36 The order regulated ISPs by prohibiting blocking, throttling, and 
“‘unreasonable discrimination’ against lawful network traffic.”37 The goal of 
these rules was to “preserve the internet as an open platform for innovation, 
investment, economic growth, [and] competition.”38 The FCC recognized 
this openness created a “virtuous cycle of innovation”39 in which “new uses 
 
 31. See In the Matter of Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C. 
2d 420, 423–24 (1968). 
 32. Reply Comments of Public Knowledge, Restoring Internet Freedom, WC Docket 17-108 
(Aug. 30, 2017), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/1083005674359/PK_Net_Neutrality_Reply_Com 
ments_2017.pdf. 
 33. See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 880 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 34. Nia Chung Srodoski, A Balancing Act: the Virtue of a “Light Touch” Regulatory 
Framework in the 2015 Open Internet Order, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 517, 536 (2016) (citing 
City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871). 
 35. See Press Release, FCC Classifies Cable Modem Service as “Information Service,” FCC 
(Mar. 14, 2002), http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/News_Releases/2002/nrcb0201.html. 
 36. 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 16, at 17905, 17926. See also Srodoski, supra note 
34, at 518. 
 37. Id. at 17906 ¶ 1. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 17910 ¶ 14. 
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of the network—including new content, applications, services, and devices 
—lead to increased end-user demand for broadband, which drives network 
improvements, which in turn lead to further innovative network uses.”40 
These rules were a regulatory response to a change in the internet ecosystem 
from the first decade of the public internet, “when dial-up was the primary 
form of consumer internet access.”41 In contrast to the days of dial-up, 
broadband providers “have the incentives to interfere with the operation of 
third-party internet-based services” that compete with the providers’ own 
services.42 
Much of the 2010 Order was struck down in 2012 by the D.C. Circuit 
in Verizon v. F.C.C.43 The court determined that because broadband 
providers were classified as an “information service” by the FCC in its 2002 
rulemaking, broadband service providers could not be regulated as a 
“telecommunications service” or “common carrier” under Title II.44 The 
court did not rule that the Commission was unable to enforce such rules, 
however. The Verizon Court acknowledged the FCC’s power to define how 
these services should be classified.45 But, in order to enforce the regulations 
it proposed, the FCC needed to reclassify ISPs as a Title II common carrier, 
because these regulations were inconsistent with the light regulatory 
authority of a Title I service.46 While the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Verizon left 
ISPs free from the 2010 Order’s conduct rules,47 such freedom was only 
temporary. A few years later, the FCC would ultimately succeed in enacting 
these rules. 
 
C.  The Internet Service Provider Market 
 
1. Structure of the Market   
 
It is important to note the features of the ISP market, as it currently 
stands, to provide better context for the necessity of net neutrality rules. 
Similar to telephone line expansion, cable companies began to build 
infrastructure across the U.S. by approaching local governments for 
permission to build and invest in infrastructure, in exchange for exclusive 
 
 40. Id. at 17910–11 ¶ 14. 
 41. Id. at 17916 ¶ 22. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Verizon v. F.C.C., 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 623–624. 
 47. Id. at 628. 
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rights to provide cable services in the area.48 Increasing prices in cable 
services and minimal competition led to the Cable Television Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act, which marked the end of this pattern of 
setting up exclusive regional franchises.49 However, by this time, the cable 
companies already built the sole cable infrastructure in their regional area.  
During the first decade of the public internet, “dial-up was the primary 
form of consumer internet access.”50 Independent companies such as 
America Online and Prodigy provided access to the internet51 over 
companies’ phone lines.52 Eventually, broadband became the internet service 
of choice because of higher speeds, fast enough to stream video.53 As 
broadband replaced dial-up, telephone and cable companies, rather than 
independent companies, emerged as the main providers of internet access 
service.54   
 
2. Proposed Pro-Competitive Solutions   
 
Some argue that more independent companies should build competing 
infrastructure, and that greater broadband deployment across the United 
States is hindered because of local governments imposing regulatory costs, 
sometimes referred to as “pre-deployment barriers.”55 However, city 
 
 48. See Mat Honan, Why the Government Won’t Protect you from Getting Screwed by Your 
Cable Company, GIZMODO (Aug. 15, 2011), https://gizmodo.com/5830956/why-the-government-
wont-protect-you-from-getting-screwed-by-your-cable-company. 
 49. See EV EHRLICH, A BRIEF HISTORY OF INTERNET REGULATION (2014), 
https://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/2014.03-Ehrlich_A-Brief-Hist 
ory-of-Internet-Regulation.pdf. 
 50. 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 16, at 17916. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Independent internet provider companies were able to use telephone company’s lines to 
provide dial-up internet service because telephone companies were required to lease their lines to 
competitors under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which instated “mandatory unbundling of 
telephone services and rigid price controls.” Telephone service and dial-up internet can be 
contrasted with the later broadband internet service, classified as an “information service” under 
the Telecommunications Act, and was not subject to mandatory unbundling requirements. See 
EHRLICH, supra note 49. 
 53. See Christopher Jon Sprigman, Net Neutrality is Great, but it Won’t Make Broadband 
Cheaper, THE NEW YORKER (June 21, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/net-
neutrality-is-great-but-it-wont-make-broadband-cheaper (discussing the unrealistic nature of 
building competing internet networks). 
 54. 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 16, at 17916. 
 55. See Berin Szoka, Jon Henke & Matthew Starr, Don’t Blame Big Cable. It’s Local 
Governments that Choke Broadband Competition, WIRED (July 16, 2013, 9:30 AM), https:// 
www.wired.com/2013/07/we-need-to-stop-focusing-on-just-cable-companies-and-blame-local-
government-for-dismal-broadband-competition/. 
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planning, safety, environmental, and engineering costs may justify these 
regulatory costs.  
Replicating a cable company’s local network is, for the most part, 
uneconomic, though some have tried. Verizon attempted to launch its own 
fiber network (“FiOS”) but eventually had to abandon the project.56 The cost 
of tearing up streets to lay fiber optic cable, or stringing cable on utility poles, 
was prohibitively expensive, except in the densest urban areas.57 Even 
Google, the technological behemoth, was unable to build out substantial 
competing networks.58  
The duplication of efforts in broadband infrastructure is not 
economically feasible for any competitive upstart. The reality is that the 
internet marketplace needs either conduct rules that control anticompetitive 
conduct by ISPs, or it needs local loop unbundling.59 “Local loop 
unbundling” refers to regulations requiring cable companies to lease access 
to their hardware, the copper and fiber-optic cables, switches, and local 
offices that connect the internet to homes and buildings.60 Such unbundling 
was implemented in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, requiring 
telephone companies to lease access to their phone lines to competitors at 
below-market prices.61 
When the D.C. appellate court upheld the FCC’s decision to reclassify 
broadband access as a telecommunications service, the FCC had the ability 
to pursue a mandate on local loop unbundling;62 however, it instead chose 
net neutrality rules as its regulatory option. As discussed in the next section, 
the decision to forgo local loop unbundling was a policy choice made by the 
2015 FCC.63 Therefore, for purposes of this paper, the 2015 Order’s net 
neutrality rules will be viewed as the primary alternative to the FCC’s current 
internet regulatory framework under the 2018 Order.  
 
 
 56. Sprigman, supra note 53. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Sprigman, supra note 53 (referring to local loop unbundling as: “an awkward term of 
art that essentially means forcing cable companies to lease access, for a price and on terms set by 
the F.C.C., to the copper and fiber-optic cables, switches, and local offices that connect the main 
arteries of the Internet to individual homes and buildings”). 
 61. See EHRLICH, supra note 49. These unbundling provisions contained a sunset provision 
in the early 2000s. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See infra Part I.D.1. 
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D.  The Open Internet Order of 2015 
 
1. A ”Light Touch” Framework   
 
In enacting the 2015 Order, the FCC recognized that ISPs are 
gatekeepers. ISPs have “significant bargaining power in negotiations with 
edge providers [that] depend on access to their networks because of their 
ability to control the flow of traffic into and on their networks.”64 This 
significant bargaining power puts ISPs in the position of gatekeeper, 
meaning that “regardless of the competition in the local market for 
broadband internet access, once a consumer chooses a broadband provider, 
that provider has a monopoly on access to the subscriber.”65 As gatekeepers, 
“[ISPs] can block access altogether; target competitors, including 
competitors to their own video services; and they can extract unfair tolls.”66 
Additionally, ISPs have “powerful incentives to accept fees from edge 
providers, either in return for excluding their competitors, or for granting 
them prioritized access to end users.”67 The FCC noted that while “the ability 
of [ISPs] to exploit this gatekeeper role could be mitigated if consumers 
could easily switch broadband providers,”68 the evidence in the record 
suggested that consumers could not easily switch broadband providers.69 A 
switch in providers was impossible in large part because “45 percent of 
households have only a single provider option for 25 Mbps/3 Mbps 
broadband service.”70 This indicates that “45 percent of households do not 
have any choices to switch to at this critical level of service.”71 To keep this 
gatekeeper power in check, the FCC adopted bright-line bans on blocking, 
throttling, and paid prioritization, the three specific practices that the 
Commission found “invariably harm[ed] the open internet.”72 The 
prohibition on blocking prevented an ISP from “block[ing] [consumer access 
 
 64. 2015 Order, supra note 5 at 5629 ¶ 80. 
 65. Id. 
 66. 2015 Order, supra note 5, at 5609 ¶ 20. 
 67. Id. at 5608 ¶ 19. 
 68. Id. at 5680–1 ¶ 80. 
 69. Id. 
 70. To qualify as broadband service, the FCC’s broadband benchmark speeds are 25 megabits 
per second (Mbps) for downloads and 3 Mbps for uploads. See 2015 Broadband Progress Report, 
FCC (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.fcc.gov/reports-research/reports/broadband-progress-reports/ 
2015-broadband-progress-report. 
 71. Id. at 5681 ¶ 81. 
 72. Id. at 5607 ¶ 14. 
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to] lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices”73 
“Throttling”  refers to the “degradation of lawful content, applications, 
services, and devices.”74 The FCC found the ban on throttling “necessary [to] 
avoid gamesmanship designed to avoid the no-blocking rule by, for example, 
rendering an application effectively, but not technically, unusable.”75 “‘Paid 
prioritization’ refers to the management of a broadband provider’s network 
to directly or indirectly favor some traffic over other traffic . . . in exchange 
for consideration (monetary or otherwise) from a third party, or to benefit an 
affiliated entity.”76 In addition to the bright-line conduct rules, the FCC 
adopted a catch-all standard generally prohibiting ISPs from engaging in any 
unreasonable interference or unreasonable disadvantage to consumers or 
edge providers.77   
The FCC found that “case-by-case enforcement can be cumbersome for 
individual consumers or edge providers,”78 choosing instead to adopt bright-
line conduct rules to regulate ISP behavior. The conduct rules would be a 
“regulatory backstop . . . prohibiting common carriers from engaging in 
unjust and unreasonable practices” and the FCC’s regulatory and 
enforcement oversight would be “complementary to vigorous antitrust 
enforcement.”79 
The FCC recognized the concern that “a swath of utility-style 
provisions” may harm ISPs’ profitability and therefore decrease investment 
in infrastructure.80 Thus, the FCC chose to apply Title II in a focused way, 
making inapplicable to ISPs over 700 codified rules otherwise applicable to 
Title II common carriers, including: “no [local loop] unbundling, no 
tariffing, [and] no rate regulation.” It referred to this focused application of 
Title II as a “light-touch” approach, “apply[ing] only those Title II provisions 






 73. Id. ¶ 15. 
 74. Id. ¶ 16. 
 75. Id. ¶ 17. 
 76. Id. at 5607–8 ¶ 18. 
 77. Id. at 5609 ¶¶ 21-2. 
 78. Id. at 5608 ¶ 19. 
 79. Id. at 5963 ¶ 203. 
 80. Id. at 5612 ¶ 38. 
 81. Id. ¶ 37. 
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II.   The Restoring Internet Freedom Order 
 
The era of a mandatory open internet ended with the final Restoring 
Internet Freedom Declaratory Ruling (“2018 Order”),82 released January 4, 
2018. The 2018 Order again reclassified broadband internet services as an 
“information service” under Title I of the Communications Act.  It 
additionally eliminated the conduct standards and the rules prohibiting 
blocking and throttling.83 Finally, the 2018 Order shifted the regulatory 
oversight of ISP practices from the FCC to the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”). The sections that follow explore each of these changes.  
 
A.  The “Lighter Touch” Framework  
 
1. Title II to Title I   
 
By reclassifying ISPs as an “general information service” under Title I 
of the Communications Act, the agency gave itself only light regulatory 
power over the actions and pricing of ISPs,84 such as the ability to impose 
disclosure requirements. In turn, the FCC deprived itself of the regulatory 
authority to impose bright-line conduct rules for ISPs in the future. The 
justification for this change was to “increase investment and encourage 
deployment of internet services to underserved areas and encourage 
upgrading of facilities in already served areas.”85 According to the FCC, the 
Title II regime “chilled investment” and prevented such deployment because 
it caused regulatory uncertainty.86 The FCC additionally cited the concern of 
“regulatory creep,” stating that regulators did not know how the 2015 Order 
would be interpreted.87 
The FCC supported its conclusion by relying on two studies looking at 
the change in ISP investments since enactment of the 2015 Order. Both 
studies concluded that aggregate ISP investment had decreased since the 
 
 82. See generally In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311 (2018) 
[hereinafter 2018 Order]. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Nia Chung Srodoski, A Balancing Act: the Virtue of a “Light Touch” Regulatory 
Framework in the 2015 Open Internet Order, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 517, 543 (2016). 
 85. 2018 Order, supra note 82, at 492 ¶ 308. 
 86. Id. at 368 ¶ 99 (stating that uncertainty of what is allowed and what is not allowed under 
the Title II regime has caused ISPs to “shelve projects that were in development, pursue fewer 
innovative business models . . . or delay rolling out new features or services”). 
 87. 2018 Order, supra note 82, at 369–70 ¶ 101 (citing statement of former FCC Chairman 
Tom Wheeler). 
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adoption of the 2015 Order, one finding that aggregate investment in 2016 
decreased a total of three percent from 2014 levels. However, the rulemaking 
also accurately acknowledged that declines in capital investment can change 
depending upon the industry and the business cycle.88 Such comparative 
studies, the FCC noted, are “only suggestive”89 since they do not  account 
for other factors such as evolving technology and the fact that “large 
investments often occur in discrete chunks rather than being spaced out 
evenly over time.”90 Additionally, the 2015 Order had specifically tailored 
the common carrier obligations of Title II to lessen potential burdens to 
ISPs,91  shielding them from aspects of Title II that ISPs claimed would hurt 
investment such as rate regulation and unbundling requirements,92 and 
replacing burdensome regulating with three, bright-line conduct rules that 
ISPs themselves stated would not discourage them from investment.93 
Nevertheless, the FCC concluded that Title II regulation has led to a 
downward trend in investment,94 and thus was too burdensome on ISPs, 
supporting a change back to Title I.  
 
2. Reliance on FTC Consumer Protection Laws and 
Antitrust  
 
a. Shifting Regulatory Oversight to the FTC  
 
Another major change the FCC made in the 2018 Order was the shifting 
of regulatory oversight of broadband ISPs’ conduct to the FTC. The FTC 
enforces federal consumer protection laws that prevent fraud, deception and 
 
 88. See S. DEREK TURNER, IT’S WORKING: HOW THE INTERNET ACCESS AND ONLINE VIDEO 
MARKETS ARE THRIVING IN A TITLE II ERA 88–9 (May 2017), https://www.freepress.net/ 
sites/default/files/2018-06/internet-access-and-online-video-markets-are-thriving-in-title-II-
era.pdf. 
 89. 2018 Order, supra note 82, ¶ 92. 
 90. Id. 
 91. 2015 Order, supra note 5, at 5603 ¶ 5. 
 92. Id. at 5818, 5849-50 ¶¶ 458, 513. 
 93. Id. at 5795-6 ¶ 416. (“Tellingly, major infrastructure providers have indicated that they 
will in fact continue to invest under the framework we adopt, despite suggesting otherwise in their 
filed comments in this proceeding. For example, Sprint asserts in a letter in this proceeding that . . . 
‘Sprint does not believe that a light touch application of Title II, including appropriate forbearance, 
would harm the continued investment in, and deployment of, mobile broadband services.’ 
Verizon’s chief financial officer, Francis Shammo, told investors in a conference call in response 
to a question about the effect of ‘this move to Title II,’ that ‘I mean to be real clear, I mean this 
does not influence the way we invest.’”) (internal citation omitted). 
 94. 2018 Order, supra note 82, ¶ 92. 
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unfair business practices.95 The FTC also enforces federal antitrust laws that 
prohibit anticompetitive mergers and other business practices that could lead 
to higher prices, fewer choices, or less innovation.  
The FTC has the authority to protect consumers from “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices” under Section 5 of the FTC Act.96 An unfair or 
deceptive act or practice is one that creates substantial consumer harm, is not 
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers, and that consumers 
could not reasonably have avoided.97 Private citizens and businesses cannot 
enforce the FTC Act because there is no private right of action; however, 
consumers and other businesses may file a complaint with the FTC about a 
business’s conduct, triggering an investigation. Then, once the FTC finds 
there to be a violation of the law, it may enter into a consent order with the 
company or begin an administrative proceeding.98  
 
b. The Transparency Rule  
 
The 2018 Order adopted a revised transparency rule, requiring “[a]ny 
person providing broadband Internet access service [to] publicly disclose 
accurate information regarding the network management practices, 
performance, and commercial terms of its broadband internet access 
services.”99 The revised transparency rule is as follows:  
Any person providing broadband Internet access service shall 
publicly disclose accurate information regarding the network 
management practices, performance, and commercial terms of its 
broadband Internet access services sufficient to enable consumers to 
make informed choices regarding the purchase and use of such 
services and entrepreneurs and other small businesses to develop, 
market, and maintain Internet offerings. Such disclosure shall be 
made via a publicly available, easily accessible website or through 
transmittal to the Commission. 100 
 
 95. The Enforcers, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitru 
st-laws/enforcers (last visited Mar. 5, 2019). 
 96. 2018 Order, supra note 82, at 606 ¶ 141 (stating that “The FTC has broad authority to 
protect consumers from ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices’” and that “[a]s the nation’s premier 
consumer protection agency, the FTC [can] exercise its authority, which arises from Section 5 of 
the FTC Act, to protect consumers in all sectors of the economy”). 
 97. Id; see also 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). 
 98. The Enforcers, supra note 95. 
 99. 2018 Order, supra note 82, at 645 ¶ 215. 
 100. Id. at 440 ¶ 220. 
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All ISPs are specifically required to disclose blocking, throttling,  
affiliated prioritization,101 congestion management,102 application-specific 
behavior,103 and device attachment rules.104  
The FCC claimed that the new transparency rule would help achieve their 
goal of identifying and addressing potential market entry barriers.105 The 
next section explains why this is an unrealistic prospect.  
 
c. Change in Authority in the 2018 Order 
 
An additional change the FCC made in the 2018 Order is the shifting of 
regulatory oversight of broadband ISPs’ conduct to the FTC. The FCC 
deemed the regulation of ISPs under 2015 Order “unnecessary to address 
conduct that harms internet openness,” and instead chose to rely on “antitrust 
law and the FTC’s authority under Section 5 of the FTC Act to prohibit unfair 
and deceptive practices.”106 
The 2018 Order relied on the voluntary commitment of the largest ISPs, 
such as AT&T and Comcast, not to block or throttle legal content.107 The 
FCC stated that the FTC’s Section 5 authority makes such voluntary 
commitments by ISPs enforceable because it “prohibits companies from 
selling consumers one product or service but providing them [with] 
something different.”108 In the event that an ISP acts in a manner inconsistent 
with its disclosures, such an act could arguably be seen as an unfair act or 
 
 101. “Affiliated Prioritization” is defined as: “Any practice that directly or indirectly favors 
some traffic over other traffic, including through use of techniques such as traffic shaping, 
prioritization, or resource reservation, to benefit an affiliate, including identification of the 
affiliate.” Id. 
 102. “Congestion Management” is defined as pertaining to: “Descriptions of congestion 
management practices, if any. These descriptions should include the types of traffic subject to the 
practices; the purposes served by the practices; the practices’ effects on end users’ experience; 
criteria used in practices, such as indicators of congestion that trigger a practice, including any 
usage limits triggering the practice, and the typical frequency of congestion; usage limits and the 
consequences of exceeding them; and references to engineering standards, where appropriate.” Id. 
 103. “Application-Specific Behavior” is defined as: “Whether and why the ISP blocks or rate-
controls specific protocols or protocol ports, modifies protocol fields in ways not prescribed by the 
protocol standard, or otherwise inhibits or favors certain applications or classes of applications.” 
Id. 
 104. “Device Attachment Rules” are defined by as: “Any restrictions on the types of devices 
and any approval procedures for devices to connect to the network.” Id. 
 105. 2018 Order, supra note 82, at 653 ¶ 233. 
 106. Id. at 393–4 ¶ 140. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 394–5 ¶ 141 (citing Acting Chairman Ohlhausen Comments at 10-11). 
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practice. 109 The FCC asserted that the FTC can “enforce these promises” not 
to block or throttle by bringing an enforcement action using its authority to 
prevent unfair or deceptive acts or practices under Section 5 of the FTC 
Act.110 This case-by-case ex post regulation, the FCC contended, is “better 
suited for regulating a dynamic industry like the internet.”111 Additionally, it 
reasoned, should ISPs decide not to make these voluntary promises, 
consumers and edge providers will resist any attempt by ISPs to undermine 
the openness of the internet.112 
The FCC’s arguments for changing this regulatory authority are flawed 
for several reasons. For one thing, the FCC gives the impression that the FTC 
will aggressively go after ISPs who break their voluntary promises. Even if 
the FTC does aggressively monitor ISPs, simply enforcing promises in an 
industry lacking competition is ineffective, because the ISPs can stop making 
voluntary promises without being faced with market pressures such as the 
“resistance” of consumers and edge providers.113 As mentioned above, most 
consumers are limited to one broadband provider,114 so once ISPs stop 
making these promises, consumers and edge providers will be powerless to 
resist, and without remedy. There will no longer be a promise for the FTC to 
enforce, and ISPs will be free to engage in anticompetitive behavior.  
 
3. Reliance on Antitrust Laws to Prevent Blocking, 
Throttling, and Paid Prioritization   
 
The FCC additionally justified repealing the 2015 Order by relying 
on the ability of both the FTC and private citizens to bring antitrust actions 
challenging any anticompetitive conduct in the internet sector.115 The FTC 
enforces three laws with respect to antitrust law: the Sherman Act, the FTC 
Act, and the Clayton Act. These are the three core federal antitrust laws in 
effect today. The Sherman Act outlaws “every contract, combination, or 
conspiracy in restraint of trade,” and any “monopolization, attempted 
monopolization, or conspiracy or combination to monopolize.” The standard 
for assessing business conduct under the Sherman Act is a two-pronged 
approach: (1) per se illegality if the conduct is considered “so harmful to 
 
 109. Id. at 395–6 ¶ 142. 
 110. Id. at 396 ¶ 142 n.512. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 396 ¶ 142. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 115. Id. 
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competition that they are almost always illegal;” and (2) rule of reason 
analysis if the conduct does not fall into an established anticompetitive 
category articulated under law.116 
The 2018 Order relies on the threat of liability under Sections 1 and 
2 of the Sherman Act to prevent ISPs from making agreements amongst 
themselves to block, throttle, or discriminate against internet content.117 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits exclusionary conduct by a firm with 
the dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.118 Section 2 
additionally prohibits vertically integrated ISPs from anticompetitively 
favoring their content or services over other unaffiliated edge providers’ 
content or services. The 2018 Order posits that many of the net neutrality 
violations cited in the 2015 Order could have been investigated as antitrust 
violations.119 The 2018 Order does not, however, address whether such 
antitrust violations would actually be challenged by a federal agency or a 
private individual, or the likelihood of success in litigation. The FCC stated 
the possibility of finding antitrust liability, without addressing the concerns 
the 2015 Order originally raised regarding feasibility of regulation through 
case-by-case enforcement. Part III of this paper examines the weaknesses of 
case-by-case antitrust enforcement, on which the FCC principally relies.  
 
B.  Standard of Review for Challenging Administrative Agency 
Rulemakings  
 
When an administrative agency makes a change to its regulations and 
such a change is challenged, a reviewing court must only set aside agency 
action when it is found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law.”120 Indeed, since the 2018 Order took 
effect, lawsuits have been filed alleging that the FCC’s regulatory changes 
were arbitrary and capricious.121 Whether the 2018 Order might be set aside 
 
 116. Jennifer E. Gladieux, Towards a Single Standard for Antitrust: The Federal Trade 
Commission’s Evolving Rule of Reason, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 471, 473 (1997). 
 117. 2018 Order, supra note 82, at 395 ¶144. 
 118. 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
 119. Id. 
 120. 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 121. For a recent challenge to the 2018 Order, see Brief for Petitioner, Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 
No. 18-1051 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 22, 2018). Various petitioners including activist groups and state 
governments challenged the 2018 Order, alleging it violated the Communications Act and is 
otherwise arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. They also 
argued the 2018 Order did not fully assess issues such as market concentration and how the antitrust 
and consumer protection laws would function in the absence of regulation by the Commission. The 
D.C. Circuit invoked the Supreme Court’s holding in Nat’l Cable & Tele. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
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under this standard of judicial review is beyond the scope of this paper. Yet, 
one important point also raised in recent litigation is whether the FCC  has 
fully assessed and supported how the consumer protection laws and antitrust 
alone would function in the absence of regulation by the FCC.122 The next 
part of this paper addresses this concern, looking specifically at the 
weaknesses of reliance on antitrust.  
 
III. Antitrust Enforcement is Not the Answer to the 
Anticompetitive Harms the Net Neutrality Rules 
Sought to Fix  
 
A.  Anticompetitive Vertical Conduct is the Main Focus of Net 
Neutrality Rules 
 
As mentioned in Part II, ISPs’ strong economic bargaining power puts 
them in a gatekeeper position, and the ability of ISPs to exploit this 
gatekeeper role cannot be mitigated by the ability of consumers to switch 
broadband providers.123 This power “distinguishes [ISPs] from other 
participants in the internet marketplace who have no similar control [over] 
access to the internet for their subscribers and for anyone wishing to reach 
those subscribers.”124 Ultimately, ISPs have a strong incentive to engage in 
exclusionary conduct, whether such conduct is through “accepting fees from 
edge providers. . .in return for excluding their competitors or for granting 
them prioritized access to end users”125 or through blocking or throttling the 
content of rival content providers that competes with an affiliate of the ISP. 
Vertical conduct refers to dealings between two companies operating in 
the same sector, but along different points in the supply chain.126 The three 
types of exclusionary conduct that the 2015 Order prohibited, blocking, 
throttling, and paid prioritization, all qualify as vertical conduct because they 
each concern ISPs exercising control over edge providers. ISPs and edge 
 
Services, which affirms the FCCs authority to classify broadband internet services as information 
services. See Paul Werner & Imad Matini, D.C. Circuit Hears Challenge to Federal 
Communications Commission’s 2018 Restoring Internet Freedom Order, FCC LAW BLOG (Feb. 4, 
2019), https://www.fcclawblog.com/2019/02/articles/fcc/challenge-to-fcc-2018-order/. 
 122. See Paul Werner & Imad Matini, supra note 121. 
 123. See supra Part I.D.1. 
 124. 2015 Order, supra note 5, at 5630 ¶ 80. 
 125. 2015 Order, supra note 5, at 5608 ¶ 19. 
 126. Versus Trump: Trump the Trustbuster (Interview with Lina Khan), TAKE CARE BLOG 
(Nov. 30, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/versus-trump-trump-the-trustbuster-interview-wit 
h-lina-khan. 
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providers are both participants in the internet marketplace, but while one 
provides the broadband service connection, the other provides the content, 
applications, and services an end user of the internet seeks to access,127 
therefore putting them at different points in the supply chain.  
While vertical conduct between ISPs and edge providers is not, by itself, 
anticompetitive, the FCC in its 2015 Order recognized that, due to the ISPs’ 
substantial market power, “the threat of harm is overwhelming.”128 A 
recognized term for this situation in antitrust law is “single firm conduct”, or 
conduct that often involves exclusion by a dominant firm.129 Such “single 
firm conduct” occurs when a company has such a strong position in the 
marketplace that their behavior may no longer be subject to competitive 
pressures.130 The vertical nature of the exclusionary conduct at issue presents 
unique challenges in terms of antitrust enforcement, which are discussed in 
the following sections.  
 
B. Anticompetitive Harm from Vertical Conduct is Viewed 
with Skepticism  
 
1. Possible Harms Resulting from Exclusionary Vertical 
Conduct  
 
ISPs can engage in several different forms of exclusionary conduct that 
results in harming competition in the internet market. These include 
imposing constraints on rival conduct,131 and engaging in vertical 
agreements to sell an exclusionary right to rivals.132 An ISP can directly 
constrain rivals by imposing costs or reducing rivals’ access to customers.133 
Constraints can be more obvious, such as when an ISP blocks or degrades 
access to unaffiliated online video to their broadband subscribers.134 
Constraints can also be slightly more subtle, but equally harmful. Take, for 
 
 127. See generally 2015 Order, supra note 5. 
 128. 2015 Order, supra note 5, at 5608 ¶ 19. 
 129. Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 527, 
529 (2012); see also Single Firm Conduct, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-
guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firm-conduct (last visited Mar. 31, 2019) (describing single 
firm conduct as actions of a single firm with market power “to the point where their behavior may 
not be subject to common competitive pressures”). 
 130. See Single Firm Conduct, supra note 129. 
 131. Baker, supra note 129, at 537. 
 132. Id. at 539. 
 133. Id. at 537. 
 134. 2015 Order, supra note 5, at 5632 ¶ 81. 
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example, “zero rating,” which is the process of choosing not to count a 
specific content provider’s packets against a customer’s data cap.135 As noted 
in the 2015 Order, data caps or allowances “can negatively influence 
customer behavior and the development of new applications.”136 In fact, we 
have already seen ISPs engage in this behavior prior to enactment of the 2015 
Order.137 
Additionally, ISPs can engage in vertical agreements to sell an 
exclusionary right to certain edge providers, “either in return for excluding 
their competitors or for granting them prioritized access to end users.”138 
This creates “fast lanes” for those edge providers able to afford it, and “slow 
lanes” for others.139 “By interfering with the transmission of third parties’ 
internet-based services or raising the cost of online delivery for particular 
edge providers, [ISPs] can make those services less attractive to subscribers 
in comparison to [rival] offerings.”140 
Unfortunately, due to the historical and ideological context of the 
antitrust laws, the cost, difficulty, and unpredictability in litigation, and the 
ineffectiveness of common behavioral remedies, antitrust law is unable to 
rectify the harms resulting from the anticompetitive exclusionary conduct of 
ISPs, as explored in detail below.   
 
2. Historically, Vertical Conduct Issues Have Been a 
Low Priority for Antitrust Enforcement   
 
Modern antitrust discourse has focused mainly on horizontal conduct, 
neglecting the area in which exclusion primarily arises, vertical 
agreements.141 Since 1980, substantially more cases involving horizontal 
restraints have been brought in the U.S. than cases where exclusion is likely 
involved, such as monopolization and vertical agreements.142 It is rare that 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. In 2014, AT&T created a policy under which edge providers could pay to be exempt from 
data caps on streaming. See Jon Brodkin, AT&T Turns Data Caps into Profits with New Fees for 
Content Providers, ASRTECHNICA (Jan. 6, 2014, 10:24 AM), http://arstechnica.com/business/ 
2014/01/att-turns-data-caps-into-profits-with-new-fees-for-content-providers/ (“Basically, the 
price of data is being charged to content providers instead of consumers.”). 
 138. 2015 Order, supra note 5, at 5609 ¶ 21. 
 139. Id. 
 140. 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 16, at 17918. 
 141. Baker, supra note 129, at 527. 
 142. Id. at 576. 
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agency challenges to vertical mergers reach completion.143 Moreover, the 
long outdated 1984 Vertical Merger Guidelines emphasize the harms of 
reduced market entry prospects and the facilitation of collusion, while 
neglecting the impacts of “foreclosure” and receiving little attention from the 
courts.144 The antitrust enforcement agencies have “emphasiz[ed] collusion 
over exclusion in articulating enforcement priorities.”145 Indeed, according 
to a former FTC chairman, it is “uncontroversial . . . that non-merger 
antitrust enforcement should focus on horizontal activities”146 
Vertical arrangements were not always neglected in antitrust discourse. 
In fact, for many years, antitrust agencies took a prophylactic approach to 
both horizontal and vertical arrangements, relying on bright-line rules and 
structural presumptions in their enforcement standards through the 1970s.147 
However, a group of scholars, often referred to as the “Chicago School,”148 
emerged as critics of this prophylactic approach, and their ideologies gained 
popularity in the lower courts, ultimately influencing the antitrust 
enforcement we have today.149  
This influential scholarship signaled a large change in antitrust 
enforcement; a shift in the approach to vertical arrangements was one 
component.150 Chicago School scholars attacked vertical merger 
enforcement as economically irrational.151 These scholars’ influence created 
a shift in thinking from what once was a general skepticism of vertical 
arrangements, to a presumption that vertical arrangements should generally 
be legal and viewed as efficient and pro-competitive.152  
In arguing that foreclosure is illusory, Chicago School scholars 
essentially assert that the vertical integration of, or agreements between, 
 
 143. See Thomas L. Greaney & Douglas Ross, Navigating Through the Fog of Vertical Merger 
Law: A Guide to Counselling Hospital-Physician Consolidation Under the Clayton Act, 91 WASH. 
L. REV. 199, 201 n.5 (2016). 
 144. Id. at 201 n.6 (citing 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 FR 26823-03). 
 145. Baker, supra note 129, at 528. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Lina M. Khan, The Ideological Roots of America’s Market Power Problem, 127 YALE 
L.J. 960, 966–7 (June 4, 2018). 
 148. Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. F. 710, 719 n.29 (2017). “‘The 
Chicago School’ refers to the group of legal scholars and economists, primarily based at the 
University of Chicago, who developed neoclassical law and economics in the mid-twentieth 
century.” Id. 
 149. Khan, supra note 147, at 965–6. 
 150. TAKE CARE BLOG, supra note 126. 
 151. Steven C. Salop, Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 1962, 1963 
(May 2018). 
 152. Id. 
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firms from different points in the supply chain do not present the risk of 
excluding rivals from inputs and customers. In other words, because these 
companies are not competing directly in the same sector, there is not actually 
a reduction in competition.153 However, we know that this is not the case in 
the internet market, because ISPs hold gatekeeper power, enabling them to 
avoid additional competitive pressure on their affiliated services by 
interfering with the transmission of third parties’ internet-based services. 
Indeed, “the concepts of anticompetitive foreclosure and leverage are not 
empty and illogical, and exclusionary strategies can profit firms and harm 
competition.”154 Nonetheless, this prevailing ideology permeates through 
antitrust enforcement, and has led to overall inattention to vertical restraints.  
 
C.  Private Antitrust Litigation Does Not Offer Adequate 
Remedies for Edge Providers 
 
The 2018 Order finds that “most of the net neutrality violations discussed 
in the 2015 Order could have been investigated as antitrust violations,”155 
focusing on whether the ISP was engaging in anticompetitive foreclosure to 
preserve monopoly power. Acting Federal Trade Commission Chairman 
Maureen Olhausen,  an opponent of net neutrality rules, argued that antitrust 
can accommodate net neutrality concerns, stating that “antitrust would forbid 
efforts by ISPs with significant market power to foreclose rival content.”156 
How accurate is this promise?  
The FTC can bring cases under the FTC Act against the same kinds of 
activities that violate the Sherman Act.157 An FTC investigation into a 
business’s conduct may be triggered by correspondence from consumers or 
other businesses. Then, once the FTC finds there to be a violation of the law, 
it may enter into a consent order with the company. If a company signs a 
consent order, it must agree to stop the disputed practices outlined in an 
accompanying complaint.158 Such consent orders, as well as consent decrees, 
 
 153. TAKE CARE BLOG, supra note 126. 
 154. Baker, supra note 129, at 532. 
 155. 2018 Order, supra note 82, at 364 ¶ 88. 
 156. HAL J. SINGER, PAID PRIORITIZATION AND ZERO RATING: WHY ANTITRUST CANNOT 
REACH THE PART OF NET NEUTRALITY EVERYONE IS CONCERNED ABOUT 7 (2017), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/aug17_singer_8_2f.aut
hcheckdam.pdf, (citing Maureen K. Olhausen, Antitrust Over Net Neutrality: Why We Should Take 
Competition in Broadband Seriously, 15 COLO. TECH. L.J. 119, 136 (2012)). 
 157. Vertical restraints are typically covered by Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
 158. The Enforcers, supra note 95. 
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are discussed below.159 Private parties, both individuals and businesses, can 
also bring suits enforcing the antitrust laws and seeking damages for 
violations of the Sherman or Clayton Acts.160 In fact, private antitrust 
enforcement vastly exceeds public enforcement, with roughly ten private 
federal cases brought for every one case brought by either the Department of 
Justice or the FTC.161 Given the lack of attention agencies give to vertical 
restraints, this portion of the paper looks specifically at private antitrust 
litigation.  
Vertical restraints are generally judged under the rule of reason.162 The 
rule of reason balances efficiencies and anticompetitive effects, requiring a 
plaintiff to show harm to competition.163 An important question, then, is 
whether there would be a cognizable antitrust violation for the vertical 
restraints contemplated by the 2015 Order under the rule of reason. 
Economist Hal. J. Singer answers this question in the negative.164 In his 
article critiquing the ability of antitrust to reach net neutrality concerns, 
Singer poses a hypothetical case in which an ISP offers preferential treatment 
for an online content supplier’s packets for a fee. The arrangement is 
discriminatory; however, there is no exclusion of other content suppliers, as 
they still have access to the ISP’s customers, just with less favorable 
treatment.165 Additionally, by offering preference to a single content provider 
while still carrying the packets of other providers, the ISP has at most 
diverted eyeballs from rival content providers’ sites.166 Such a mild 
preference likely would not raise a content rival’s cost. Without price or 
output effects, a complainant would have difficulty demonstrating 
anticompetitive effects.167  
The harm identified in Singer’s hypothetical is potential loss of 
innovation.168 The 2015 Order referred to this as disruption to the “virtuous 
cycle of innovation.”169 Rival content providers in a paid prioritization 
scenario would be discouraged from investing in R&D and developing 
superior content if they believed the playing field was slanted toward a rival 
 
 159. See infra Part III.C. 
 160. The Enforcers, supra note 95. 
 161. Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1179 (2008). 
 162. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
 163. SINGER, supra note 156, at 1, 5. 
 164. Id. at 9. 
 165. SINGER, supra note 156, at 5. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 6. 
 169. 2015 Order, supra note 5, at 5627 ¶ 77. 
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content provider.170 Harm to innovation, however, though recognized by 
antitrust law as an anticompetitive injury, is difficult to prove.171 From an 
antitrust perspective, harm to the consumer is the primary concern,172 and 
without immediate price or output effects, the harm inflicted on the rival 
content providers likely would not be considered an antitrust violation. Then, 
even if harm to consumers is proven, the harm must be balanced against 
possible efficiencies in a rule of reason analysis. Even Olhausen 
acknowledged that there may be no antitrust violation if an “edge provider 
partners with an ISP that agrees to prioritize its content over lesser 
alternatives,”173 the very conduct the net neutrality rules were aimed to 
prevent.  
Antitrust agencies do not typically bring harm-to-innovation cases, 
instead focusing resources on restrictions limiting or excluding firms from 
working with horizontal rivals.174 This leaves the private litigant to bring a 
case on a difficult to prove antitrust harm. In addition to the difficulty in 
bringing the case, there are practical impediments to prevailing in court. 
Antitrust cases move slowly. The Georgetown study of private antitrust 
litigation conducted in the early 1980s found that antitrust cases take, on 
average, about three times longer than other federal cases from initiation of 
the lawsuit to disposition.175 Although this study is older, the average time 
from filing of an antitrust case to trial has only increased, from over 18 
months in 1996, to over 24 months in 2007.176 Additionally, private litigants 
will be unlikely to want to bring an antitrust suit given the low likelihood of 
prevailing. One percent of all private federal antitrust cases reach a jury trial 
and most cases are either disposed of procedurally through motions for 
summary judgment or dismissal or through settlements.177 The possibility of 
receiving compensation is distant due to the lengthy time frames of antitrust 
litigation, and, given the low rate of success, it is unlikely. 
 
 170. SINGER, supra note 156, at 5. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See Khan, supra note 147, at 963–4 (“[T]he current “consumer welfare” approach [holds] 
that output maximization is the proper goal of antitrust.”). 
 173. SINGER, supra note 156, at 7 (citing Maureen K. Olhausen, Antitrust Over Net Neutrality: 
Why We Should Take Competition in Broadband Seriously, 15 COLO. TECH. L.J. 119, 136 (2012)). 
 174. Id. at 6. 
 175. Daniel A Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 675, 691–
2 (2010). 
 176. Id. at 692. 
 177. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, CONTROLLING COSTS OF ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT AND LITIGATION (2012), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/adminis 
trative/antitrust_law/2013_agenda_cost_efficiency_kolasky.pdf. 
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Moreover, because of the extended timeline of antitrust cases, there may 
not be adequate remedies under antitrust law to cure the loss of innovation 
at the edge caused by the anticompetitive conduct. As Singer concludes, 
“offering foreclosed content providers, at least some of which are startups, a 
venue that could take multiple years and millions of dollars in litigation 
expenses is tantamount to offering no relief at all.”178 
 
D. Vertical Mergers as an Example of Antitrust Law’s 
Permissive View of Vertical Conduct   
 
Vertical mergers, one subsect of vertical agreement in which vertical 
restraints and other exclusionary behavior may arise, provide a 
demonstrative window into the permissive view antitrust discourse generally 
takes toward vertical arrangements. It is rare that agency challenges to 
vertical mergers reach completion.179 Moreover, the long outdated 1984 
Vertical Merger Guidelines emphasize the harms of reduced market entry 
prospects and the facilitation of collusion, while neglecting the impacts of 
“foreclosure” and receiving little attention from the courts.180 Even 
supposing antitrust agency enforcement occurs, courts may still be reluctant 
to find that such vertical arrangements are illegal. A recent example of this 
is the AT&T-Time Warner merger.  
 
1. The Merger Between AT&T and Time Warner  
 
In November of 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) brought 
a civil action to prevent AT&T from acquiring Time Warner because the 
effect “may be to substantially lessen competition” in violation of Section 7 
of the Clayton Act.181 The Government alleged that the newly combined firm 
would likely “use its control of Time Warner’s popular programming as a 
weapon to harm competition.”182 In June of 2018, Judge Richard Leon of the 
U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia approved the vertical merger 
between AT&T and Time Warner.183 The approved deal combines one of the 
 
 178. SINGER, supra note 156, at 6. 
 179. See Thomas L. Greaney & Douglas Ross, Navigating Through the Fog of Vertical Merger 
Law: A Guide to Counselling Hospital-Physician Consolidation Under the Clayton Act, 91 WASH. 
L. REV. 199, 201 n.5 (2016). 
 180. Id. at 201 n.6 (citing 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 FR 26823-03). 
 181. See generally United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d. 161 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d sub 
nom. United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 182. Complaint at 2, United States v. AT & T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d. 161 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 183. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d. at 161. 
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world’s largest telecom carriers with one of the world’s largest media 
organizations. It was approved barely six months after the repeal of the 2015 
Order’s conduct rules.  
The DOJ made several arguments in opposition of the merger. First, the 
DOJ argued that the merger would enable the merged firm to charge AT&T’s 
rival video distributors higher prices for popular Time Warner content.184 
This  would lead video distributors to either pass on this higher price to 
consumers by raising their own prices, or to no longer provide Time Warner 
content at all, which would result in loss of customers to the rival 
distributor.185 Judge Leon dismissed this argument, stating that the 
government did not meet its burden of proof in demonstrating that the 
merged firm would be able to charge higher prices for Time Warner 
content.186 The DOJ’s second argument was that the merger would 
substantially lessen competition by creating an increased risk that the merged 
firm would act either unilaterally or in coordination with Comcast-NBCU to 
foreclose other multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs) from 
entering the market.187 In response to this argument, Judge Leon noted that 
“the benefits associated with AT&T customers accessing virtual MVPD 
content continue to accrue even when they use DirecTV Now’s competitors 
like Sling and YouTube TV.”188 Video content, no matter the source, would 
be using data on the AT&T network that the ISP could charge consumers 
for. In other words, AT&T would lack the incentive to foreclose competing 
video content because all video content would equally add to a consumer’s 
data usage. Finally, the government argued that the merged firm could harm 
competition between content distributors by preventing AT&T’s rival 
distributors from using the offer of Time Warner’s HBO programming as a 
promotional tool to attract and retain customers.189 The Judge found that the 
DOJ failed to show that there were no adequate or equally-priced substitutes 
for HBO content.  
While critics have called the DOJ’s arguments weak,190 they do still get 
to the heart of the issues facing vertical merger enforcement in the realm of 
net neutrality: exclusion.  
 
 184. Id. at 164. 
 185. Id. at 194. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 244. 
 189. Id. at 194. 
 190. See Nilay Patel, The Court’s Decision to Let AT&T and Time Warner Merge is 
Ridiculously Bad, THE VERGE (June 15, 2018) https://www.theverge.com/2018/6/15/17468612/ 
att-time-warner-acquisition-court-decision. 
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The AT&T-Time Warner Merger case provides a real-life example of 
the flaws persistent in the Chicago School’s justifications for lax treatment 
of vertical mergers. The merger presents a serious foreclosure concern, 
namely that the merged firm will raise the prices of Time Warner content, or 
withhold that content, from other video distributors. 
One additional argument the DOJ did not make is that the merged firm 
could easy engage in paid prioritization arrangements with other content 
providers, by engaging the content providers, either voluntarily, or through 
coercion, to commit to paying fees to exclude other content providers.191 This 
type of exclusionary conduct by a merged firm is especially salient in the 
wake of the FCC’s repeal of the net neutrality rules. Without the 2015 
Order’s non-discrimination provisions, there is no ban on prioritization and 
throttling of rival content. An ISP is thus not only able, but is incentivized, 
to throttle back streaming and downloading speeds of all rival, non-affiliated 
content, and raise the prices of access to their distribution network. 
Ultimately, however, given the presumption of legality imbued on vertical 
mergers,192 courts are still going to be reluctant to find vertical mergers 
illegal. The ability for ISPs to merge with content providers magnifies the 
incentive for ISPs to engage in restraining rivals by imposing costs or 
otherwise reducing rivals’ access to consumers. The repeal of the 2015 
Order’s conduct rules allows for ISPs to engage in this anticompetitive 
behavior.  
While such an argument based on the repeal of the 2015 Order may have 
been a missed opportunity in the AT&T-Time Warner merger challenge,193 
it can be posed in future merger challenges involving ISPs and content 
providers. 
 
2. Conduct Remedies are Ineffective 
 
What if Judge Leon had indeed found the AT&T-Time Warner merger 
to be anticompetitive? Would the remedies imposed by the court effectively 
prevent the harms to innovation at the edge that the net neutrality rules 
sought to prevent? Such a question involves a closer look into typical 
methods of redress.  
When the DOJ or FTC determines that a merger is anticompetitive, it 
must usually choose between two options: seek to block the merger in court, 
or negotiate a remedy that will allow merging parties to continue the 
 
 191. Id. 
 192. See supra Part III.A. 
 193. Patel, supra note 190. 
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transaction, if they agree to conditions that are intended to protect 
competition.194 When cases involve allegations of exclusive dealing, a rule 
of reason analysis is required. Rather than trying to meet the burden of 
establishing a “full causal mechanism” under the rule of reason, it has been 
easier for agencies to settle with merging firms, imposing remedies while 
allowing the merger to go through.195 “Merger remedies take two basic 
forms: one addresses the structure of the market, the other the conduct of the 
merged firm.”196 “Structural remedies” may be imposed, under which the 
combining entities must divest certain of their assets to a new competitor 
associated with one of their overlapping business lines.197 Alternatively, 
“behavioral remedies,” also known as conduct remedies, “allow parties of a 
merger to integrate fully, but then impose operating rules on their business 
behavior in order to prevent competition from being undermined or 
compromised.”198 Recently, the DOJ has looked more fondly upon 
behavioral remedies, specifically endorsing them for vertical mergers.199 The 
2011 Remedies Guide states that in vertical cases, conduct remedies “often” 
address competitive concerns,200 and that conduct remedies are a “valuable 
tool” for preserving efficiencies of a merger while remedying competitive 
harm.201  
One form of conduct relief suitable for addressing possible 
anticompetitive behavior by an ISP merged with a content provider is fair 
dealing provisions.202 Fair dealing provisions are those that encompass equal 
access, equal efforts, and non-discrimination.203 Nondiscrimination 
 
 194. Philip A. Proger & J. Bruce McDonald, Federal Antitrust Enforcers Taking More 
Regulatory, but More Flexible, Approach to Merger Remedies, JONES DAY (June 2010), 
https://www.jonesday.com/federal_antitrust_enforcers/. 
 195. JOHN KWOKA, REVIVING MERGER CONTROL: A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR REFORMING 
POLICY AND PRACTICE 44 (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2018/10/Kwoka-Reviving-Merger-Control-October-2018.pdf. 
 196. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES (Oct. 
2004), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.pdf [hereinafter 2004 REMEDIES 
GUIDE]. 
 197. Proger & McDonald, supra note 194. 
 198. John E. Kwoka & Diana L. Moss, Behavioral Merger Remedies: Evaluation and 
Implications for Antitrust Enforcement, 57 THE ANTITRUST BULL. 979, 982 (2012). 
 199. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES (June 
2011), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/272350.pdf, superseding 2004 REMEDIES 
GUIDE [hereinafter 2011 REMEDIES GUIDE]. 
 200. 2011 REMEDIES GUIDE, supra note 199, at 4. 
 201. Id. at 6–7. 
 202. 2004 REMEDIES GUIDE, supra note 196, at 22. 
 203. Id. 
Gray Erased_[Final-for-Tom] Rubin_The Heavy Burden of a Lighter Touch 
Framework.docx (Do Not Delete)4/8/2019  1:53 PM 
258 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:2 
provisions prevent discriminatory conduct between two downstream 
producers, and would effectively prohibit paid (or unpaid) prioritization of 
content by ISPs.  
Nondiscrimination provisions, however, require extensive time and 
resources by the agencies to enforce against the merged firm.204 The DOJ’s 
favorable view of conduct remedies in the 2011 Remedies Guide fails to 
account for the substantial cost posed by conduct remedies.205 Prohibiting or 
requiring certain actions to be taken by a firm “does not negate its incentive 
to pursue profit or its interest in circumventing the prohibition.”206 Therefore, 
behavioral remedies require ongoing oversight, monitoring, and compliance 
enforcement by the government, all of which impose substantial costs and 
strain on the agencies,207 making it difficult for agencies to keep up with 
monitoring efforts. The outcome of the recent Comcast-NBCU merger 
demonstrates these difficulties.  
 
a. The Comcast-NBCU Merger 
 
In 2009, Comcast, the largest cable company in the United States, sought 
to enter a joint venture with General Electric (GE) to acquire NBC, a network 
that controls multiple popular cable networks including Bravo, Syfy and the 
USA network.208 Additionally, NBC controlled other programming such as 
nightly news and the Olympics, which it aggregated and sold to 
distributors.209 The DOJ was concerned that distributors competing with 
Comcast would be at a disadvantage after the merger, because the merged 
firm would be able to raise fees on all of the NBC-controlled content it sold 
to other distributors.210 The DOJ brought an action to enjoin the merger under 
the Clayton Act, alleging these anticompetitive effects of the merger, and 
additionally alleging that the merged firm could also damage online video 
distributors (OVDs) by restricting access to its programming.211 Instead of 
 
 204. Id. at 8. 
 205. Kwoka & Moss, supra note 198, at 983–984 (noting that “although [the costs of 
implementing behavioral remedies] were central to the 2004 Remedies Guide approach [of favoring 
structural remedies], that discussion is deleted without explanation of the basis for changed 
thinking”). 
 206. Id. at 997. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Complaint at 7 ¶ 16, United States v. Comcast Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d 145, 147 (D.D.C. 
2011). 
 209. Id. at 5, ¶ 8. 
 210. United States v. Comcast Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d 145, 147 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 211. Id. 
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litigating the case, the government came to an agreement with Comcast via 
consent decree, allowing the merger to go through, subject to over 100 
conduct conditions imposed by a consent decree with the DOJ and the 
FCC.212  
There is consensus that the behavioral conditions in this deal failed, as 
Comcast has repeatedly been found violating conditions. One condition in 
the deal that was violated was a “neighbor-hooding provision” prohibiting 
Comcast-NBC from discriminating against rival channels, making sure they 
are not made more difficult to access.213 Comcast was cited by the FCC in 
2011 for failing to offer Bloomberg news network with the same high 
definition offerings that were available with MSNBC and CNBC. Comcast 
settled with the FCC for $800,000 in 2012; however, other smaller 
companies were facing this same disparate treatment but were not coming 
forward with their complaints.214 Generally, Bloomberg, a larger player, was 
unable to receive equal treatment from Comcast, so there was a chilling 
effect in the market, where other smaller players were not necessarily 
bringing their complaints forward.215 The consent decree required that the 
merged firm provide OVDs with access to the NBC programming at the 
same rates offered to Comcast, with fair licensing terms.216 Additionally, the 
consent decree required that Comcast, as an ISP, shall not engage in 
prioritization of its own content over any other content.217 Comcast has been 
caught setting caps on unaffiliated online content several different times, in 
different service areas throughout the country.218  
Research also supports the inadequacy of such merger remedies, 
showing that such provisions do little to remedy the competitive harms posed 
by vertical mergers. A study by economist John Kwoka found that mergers 
subject to divestiture remedies resulted in price increases of about 5.6 
percent.219 This differed very little from the price increases seen in mergers 
that were allowed to proceed unquestioned.220 Conduct remedies, as present 
in the Comcast-NBCU merger, fared even worse, resulting in an average 
 
 212. TAKE CARE BLOG, supra note 126. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Modified Final Judgment at 9–10, United States v. Comcast Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d 145 
(D.D.C. 2011), https://www.justice.gov/file/492176/download. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Comcast: A History of Broken Promises, CONSUMER REPORTS (Mar. 1, 2014), 
https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/research/comcast-a-history-of-broken-promises/. 
 219. KWOKA, supra note 195, at 47. 
 220. Id. 
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price increase of above 13 percent.221 FTC research shows that structural 
remedies successfully restored lost competition in only a minority of 
cases.222 While conduct remedies have increasingly become the remedy of 
choice for vertical mergers, studies have shown that both structural and 
behavioral remedies are “at best only partially effective in constraining firms 
that have been allowed to merge.223  
To the extent conduct remedies are used, they take the form of consent 
decrees, and we have seen that such decrees don’t work to address the 
anticompetitive harms of a vertical merger. The internet industry is most 
vulnerable to exclusionary conduct through vertical arrangements. In a 
where vertical arrangements are viewed permissively, it becomes even more 
likely that exclusionary conduct will occur. If such conduct is challenged, it 
will often be subject to ineffective conduct remedies that are demonstrably 




ISPs’ possession of gatekeeper power in the internet marketplace 
incentivizes them to adopt anticompetitive practices favoring the content of 
their affiliate content providers and profiting through establishment of fast 
and slow lanes. In 2008, the FCC filed its first major action against an ISP 
for slowing down internet traffic (also known as “throttling”).224 In 2012, 
Verizon was caught blocking application downloads.225 That same year, 
AT&T was found to have blocked Facebook access to its customers with 
Apple devices.226 These were the types of harms the 2015 Order addressed.   
The net neutrality rules of the 2015 Order provided an administrative 
approach to ensuring the efficient ordering of relationships between 
distribution and media.  It provided bright-line conduct rules under Title II 
 
 221. Id. 
 222. See FTC, A STUDY OF THE COMMISSION’S DIVESTITURE PROCESS (1999), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/study-commissions-divestiture-proc 
ess/divestiture_0.pdf. 
 223. See Kwoka & Moss, supra note 198, at 98. 
 224. See In the Matter of Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against 
Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C. Rcd. 13028, 
13034, ¶ 13 (2008). 
 225. Consent Decree, In the Matter of Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless, 20 F.C.C. 
Rcd. 8936, ¶¶ 2,4 (2012), https://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=In+the+ 
Matter+of+Cellco+Partnership+d/b/a+Verizon+Wireless,+20+F.C.C.+Rcd+8936&ie=UTF-8&o 
e=UTF-8. 
 226. David Kravets, Net Neutrality Groups Challenge AT&T FaceTime Blocking, WIRED 
(Sept. 18, 2012), https://www.wired.com/2012/09/factime-fcc-flap/. 
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authority, giving ISPs clear guidance as to what they were permitted to do. 
However, despite scant evidence that harm was unlikely, the FCC went 
forward with deregulating internet service providers, putting all trust in the 
FTC and the antitrust laws to combat anticompetitive behavior by ISPs.  
This note has argued that the “lighter touch framework” of the 2018 
Order provides an illusion of control, while exposing the internet 
marketplace to the risk of anticompetitive harms that were effectively dealt 
with in the 2015 Order. Repealing the conduct rules in favor of case-by-case 
antitrust enforcement ultimately puts the burden on the consumer and the 
edge provider to enforce ISP wrongdoing, an outcome the net neutrality rules 
sought to prevent.  
 
